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BOOK REVIEWS
few of these dramatic changes turn out to be both unpredictable and
important. The most famous example is Theodore Roosevelt's appoint-
ment of Holmes, based on evaluation of Holmes' willingness to bust the
trusts; his dissent in the Nothern Securities case'0 was a disappointment.
But by and large Roosevelt must have been satisfied with Holmes.2
Similarly, few who knew Senator Black seriously thought that his appoint-
ment would advance the racist cause; the Klan, which has occasionally
worked to influence Supreme Court appointments,22 was certainly not
known to be working for Black. If the unpredictability of judicial
behavior is a myth, its persistence is nonetheless easily explained; the
reader of Decision will find it almost his only comfort as he is con-
stantly reminded of the fortuities of judicial selection.
PATRICK L. BAUDEt
20. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
21. Roosevelt's letter of inquiry to Lodge shows more concern with Holmes' phi-
losophy than with his stand on concrete issues. Roosevelt was, for example, troubled by
Holmes' views of Marshall but cheered by his Phi Beta Kappa Address. 1 LODGE-
RoosEmvET CORRESPONDENCE 517-19 (1925). But see 6 T. RoosELT, LFrrss 1393 (E.
Morrison ed. 1952), an early negative assessment.
22. See DANELSKI, supra note 1, at 165-66.
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
HALFWAY To TAX RiEFORm By Joseph A. Ruskay and Richard A.
Osserman. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.
1970. Pp. x, 307. $8.95.
Halfway to Tax Reform would enable an intelligent layman to
learn what was accomplished by the Tax Reform Act of 1969' and to
become aware of many remaining features of the federal tax law which
still need further reform. Although occasionally the authors venture
into state and local taxation, such as the exemption of church-owned
property from state and local taxes,2 the federal income tax receives most
attention. There is also some discussion of needed reforms of the federal
gift and estate tax.2
The book contains an extensive list of what is alleged by many tax
scholars and economists to be tax preferences. To catalog all these tax
1. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (codified in scattered sections of INT. REV. CODE
of 1954).
2. J. RUSKAY & R. OSSERMAN, HALFWAY TO TAX REFORM 14-16 (1970) [herein-
after cited as RuSKAY & OSSERIAN].
3. Id. at 125-26, 134-49.
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preferences would result in an unduly long review.4 Accordingly, this
review comments on only a few of the more well-known preferences.
Much of the impetus for the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1969 came from widespread publicity given to a Treasury study which
showed that 154 persons with adjusted gross incomes over 200,000
dollars in 1966 paid no federal income tax.' Actually this came as no
surprise to tax scholars. For people with substantial wealth and oppor-
tunity to invest in tax shelters, the highly progressive, top rates have been
a myth for many years. It is also quite correct, as the authors indicate,
that although the Tax Reform Act of 1969, by imposing a minimum tax
and through other techniques, reduced the opportunities for tax sheltered
income, many opportunities still exist. It would be difficult for any tax
scholar to contend that we now have an entirely equitable tax system in
which all persons with equivalent incomes, as judged by accountants or
economists, are taxed equally.
One of the problems in securing tax reform is that there invariably
is some argument that can be made on behalf of a particular tax pre-
ference. For instance, high risks in drilling wells and need for known
oil reserves justify percentage depletion;6 financial needs of private
colleges justify the deduction for value of appreciated property (not
adjusted basis) given to them;' and so forth. If ideological grounds
can be found to defend most tax preferences, the combined political
strength of those benefiting under the existing tax law makes a com-
prehensive tax reform act such as that proposed by the authors a re-
mote possibility.
One of the discouraging aspects of proposed tax reform is that con-
gressional committees, after listening to the arguments for and against
an alleged tax preference, frequently compromise with a partial curb.
The compromise almost invariably is more complex than the previous
law. An example of this is the attempt to change to a rule that appreciated
property given to a charitable organization must be deducted at its present
value, rather than allowing deduction at a lower cost basis. When Con-
gress finished with this proposed change under the Tax Reform Act of
1969, the result was a very complex set of rules.8 When half-way reform is
4. While I differ with the authors on a few alleged tax preferences, on most I am
in agreement with their position. In fact, the authors are to be commended for covering
as much as they did in a short book.
5.. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1969).
6. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 613.
7. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 170(b), (e).
8. The provisions include INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 170, 507-09, 642(c), 664,
4940-48.
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achieved, how great is the gain if the resulting distinctions and classifica-
tions are so numerous and complex that they will be difficult for Internal
Revenue to audit and administer effectively? Certainly the gain is
minimal if unsophisticated taxpayers pay unanticipated tax deficiencies
because they did not understand these complexities.
A true tax reform, which rejected compromises on unjustifiable tax
preferences, would also result in tax simplification. That in itself would
be an additional tax reform. Perhaps a feasible way to achieve such a
reform would be to have some agency outside the Congress, such as a
new Internal Revenue Commission, lower tax rates substantially by
closing tax preferences, and then have Congress either enact or reject
the Commission's recommendations without amendment.
One problem which the authors do not discuss is the relationship of
inflation to the federal income tax. This is particularly important in re-
gard to the treatment of capital gains. Does a man who bought common
stock in 1950 and sells it in 1971 for twice the price have a gain if the
purchasing power of the dollar is only one-half in 1971 what it was in
1950? Similarly, is the depreciation allowance adequate for a building
built in the 1940's if the cost of replacing that building now would be
much greater than the cost on which the depreciation deduction is com-
puted? Thus, a policy argument for the preferential treatment of long-
term capital gains is that it would compensate in a crude manner for
taxing illusory gains resulting from inflation. It might also serve as a
crude averaging device for a gain realized at one point in time which has
resulted from appreciation in value over a long period of time. This
argument, however, has little validity when the holding period is only
six months and one day.' Lengthening the minimum holding period for
a long-term gain and, perhaps, putting the deduction for long-term gains
on a sliding scale with larger deductions for longer holding periods would
strengthen the fairness of capital gains taxation.
Two other tax preferences whose practical appeal can be blunted by
inflation are insurance and municipal bonds. In many cases the owner
of the municipal bonds'0 will suffer a net loss if comparison is made to
what he could have realized if he had invested in growth common stock,
paid income tax on the dividends and then sold for a capital gain. The
families of many holders of life insurance will also lose more to in-
flation than is gained from the tax shelter that renders the increase in
9. This is the minimum holding period to qualify for long-term capital gain treat-
ment. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1222(3).
10. Interest paid on municipal bonds is specifically excluded from gross income
by INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 103(a) (1).
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cash surrender value-free and excludes death proceeds from income."
To a considerable extent the authors give pros and cons for various
alleged tax preferences. However, in the case of the exemption for state
and local government bonds, 2 I think there was inadequate presentation
of the arguments for continuance of the exclusion. There clearly is a
substantial benefit to state and local government from the existing exemp-
tion. Because of the tax exclusion from gross income of the interest,
these governmental units are able to pay interest rates approximately
two per cent lower than that paid on taxable corporate bonds. This
saving decreases taxes, particularly on the home owner, who bears a
large portion of the tax cost of state and local government. As the
various attempts to tax municipal bonds have shown, officials of state
and local governments will exert great political pressure to prevent this
change. If these bonds are to be taxed, some federal subsidy to state and
local government to compensate for the increased interest cost would
probably be needed.
If the exclusion from gross income of municipal bond interest is
changed, one germane policy issue is whether the change is to be retr-
active. To make it applicable to bonds outstanding would cause those
bonds to decrease substantially in market value, with the decrease being
greatest for those with the longest period to maturity. Since this inter-
governmental tax immunity is a doctrine almost as old as the nation,'" a
holder of such a bond would have just cause to believe that he had been
treated unjustly. In effect, he would have been subjected to a capital levy.
However, if Congress concludes that equity requires that a change in
regard to tax exempt interest not be retroactive, the primary problem
will continue for many years. The major objection to tax-exempt bond
interest is the inequity of not taxing this income while an equal amount of
income in the accounting sense from another source is taxed to others.
One conclusion to be drawn from this is that it is much easier to prevent a
tax loophole from being created in the first place. Once a tax loophole
exists, the market place adjusts to the existence of the loophole. As a
result, elimination of the loophole tends to be more difficult than having
prevented the loophole would have been originally. The disruption of
both the municipal bond market and of many planned local bond issues
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 101.
12. RuSKAY & OSSERMAN, supra note 2, at 95-105.
13. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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during the congressional hearings on the 1969 Act was a vivid example
of the dislocation that can come from tax reform.
The authors sometimes, particularly in the area of imputed income,
go beyond what even the most responsible members of the Congress
would be likely to support. For instance, the services in the home of a
non-working wife are argued to be income. 4 The example is given of a
couple who both work but have the same combined income as another
couple where only the husband works. Strict equity, it is argued, re-
quires that there be imputed income from the non-working wife's services
in the home. The administrative difficulties of taxing the value of these
services is acknowledged by the authors. For the government to tax the
value of' services of a wife for her family is a shocking concept. The
example given by the authors has some persuasion, but this probably
stems from the seeming inequity of splitting income on a joint return,
rather than from the appeal of the imputed income concept. Splitting
income is a fact when both husband and wife have income; where only the
husband has income it is a fictional device to eliminate inequity between
community property and common law states. Abandoning the split
income concept and not recognizing community property concepts under
the federal tax laws has more appeal to me than imputing income from
intra-family services.
The 1969 Act introduced a discrimination against couples whose
partners both work. Surprisingly, this inequity has received little
attention. When rates were lowered for single persons, a situation was
created in which a married couple both working and having approximately
equal incomes pay more tax than if single and living together. For
instance, if each working spouse had an income of 10,000 dollars the
extra tax is 280 dollars !1"
While further tax reform is needed, there is doubt that it can be
achieved. The authors, however, have rendered a valuable service by
their summary of remaining tax preferences. The public should not be
led by the "Tax Reform" label on the 1969 Act to believe that nothing
remains to be done.
WILLIAM W. OLIVERt
14. RUSKAY & OSSER.MIAN, supra note 2, at 200-01.
15. Richards, Single v. Married Income Tax Returns Under the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, 48 TAXES 301, 302 (1970).
'1 Professor of Law, Indiana University; Editor, THE TAX COUNSELOR'S QUARTEZLY.
